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BOOKS 
Belief and Language 
tephen Carter. Tk Culture of Disbelief. 
r\ew York: Basic Books, 1993, 277 pp. 
In his book TM Culture of Disbelief, 
Yale law professor Stephen Carter 
makes a powerful point about our 
political culture's tendency to discount 
any policy view that is infected with the 
taint of religious motivation. In con-
texts as varied as the fights over public 
rhool curricula, the problems in 
accommodating religious beliefs in the 
administration of the military and pris-
ons, and the painful national struggle 
"''ith life issues like abortion and 
euthanasia, Professor Caner hammers 
home the sensible notion that a policy 
\1ew should be accepted or rejected on 
Its own merits, without regard for its 
moti\'ating source, religious or other-
"'ise. 
All of this is based on the 
premise that, in fact, American popu-
lar culture, in Caner's words, "con-
ifml/994 
signs Americans who take their reli-
gion seriously to the lunatic fringe," an 
assumption challenged by Michael 
Kinsley in his review of the book in the 
New Republic, who asks "Does any-
body really think it's harder to stand 
up in public, in 1993 America, and say 
' I believe in God,' than it is to stand up 
and say, 'I don't?'" 
I think Kinsley and Carter are 
both right-Kinsley in his insistence 
that there is an expected, perhaps 
even mandatory, level of subscription 
to religious belief that serves as a base-
line for popular discourse, and Carter 
in his concern that any discernible 
nod toward religion is one that 
demeans the power of religion in peo-
ple's lives, that, again Carter's words, 
treats "God as a hobby." What troubles 
me, though , is that Carter himself 
seems unwilling to fully engage that 
potential power as a force in discourse, 
except when it fits with a predeter-
mined set of rational justification prin-
ciples. It seems to me that Carter has 
bought into what I'll call the "Culture 
of Rationality," and he carefully con-
strains his discussions accordingly. 
Perhaps Carter himself has a fear of 
being consigned to the lunatic fringe, 
especiall} by the notoriously cynical 
legal academy. 
In a review of the book in First 
Things, law profe sor Phillip Johnson 
of Berkeley uses as a structural 
metaphor this comment made by the 
sociologist Peter Berger: "If India is 
the most religious country in the 
world, and Sweden the least religious, 
then America is a nation of Indians 
ruled by Swedes." Professor johnson 
then notes Caner's "ambivalence 
about whether he wants to be a Swede 
or an Indian "-notably, Carter's con-
clusionary stance on the teaching of 
creationism in schools as wrongheaded 
because it's "shoddy science, not sci-
ence at all, really." Moreover, this 
apparent inconsistency runs through 
much of the book; that is, o the one 
hand Carter condemns the cultural 
hostility toward religion while on the 
other he dismisses in cursory fashion 
the substance of views, like those of the 
creationists, as ultimately unsound. 
In my view, the crux of the prob-
lem can be seen in Carter's epistemo-
logical chapter (Ch. 11), in which he 
successfully argues that the discomfort 
with religiously-based claims stems 
from the inability of post-
Enlightenment thought to deal with 
claims that don't fall into neat cate-
gories of facts vs. \"alues. For example, 
the statement that there is life after 
death is a factual claim, but isn't 
testable by " cientific" mental observa-
tion. Carter faults the so-called liberal 
mind for simply rejecting such a factu-
al claim without accounting for what 
might be a rational basis for making 
it-namely, that it comports with plau-
sible interpretation of the Bible. So, 
according to Carter, religious claims 
should not be triviali.£Cd as irrational 
because they defy materialistic proof; 
instead they may lay claim to "rational-
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ity" because they are testable by refer-
ence to a text, God's word (even 
though he is at great pains to repeat 
his personal disagreement with many 
Christian text-based claims). But 
Carter's defense of the rationality of 
religious claims itself rests on a notion 
of rationality that presupposes the exis-
tence of some external confirmation-
either material observation or a text. 
Carter does not take, or even typ-
ically consider, the scarier epistemo-
logical step: that there may exist truth 
for believers that is not testable by any 
external means. Neither here, nor I 
would guess in any other forum , is 
there serious consideration given to 
the epistemological possibility of 
knowledge that is not "rational" in the 
sense of being testable by external 
forces. Ironically, too, it may be pre-
cisely the "irrational" aspects of reli-
gious life that believers who might be 
expected to reject religion in this tech-
nologically sophisticated and highly 
cynical culture find most compelling. 
It's not surprising that Carter 
doesn't take on such precarious episte-
mological issues. Being called irra-
tional is about the worst epithet that 
one can level at one's opponent in 
serious debate, especially in the legal 
academy. And here it may be worth 
considering whether it's especially 
hard for people whose gender or race 
has historically been considered less 
"rational" to champion serious consid-
eration of notions that fall outside 
comfortable post-Enlightenment dia-
logue. For women and people of color, 
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whose membership in the cult of ratio-
nality was hard-won, there are consid-
erable risks to challenging that struc-
ture. But until we do, we cannot be sat-
isfied that our culture is really taking 
our religion seriously. 
Laura Gaston Dooley 
Walter L. Reed, Dialogues of the Word: 
The Bible as Literature According to 
Bakhtin. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993. 
The last fifteen years have wit-
nessed growing dialogue between 
schools of Biblical and literary criti-
cism as Biblical studies have explored 
questions of genre, imagery, and nar-
rative. These years have also seen 
increasing employment of the ideas 
and concepts of the Russian thinker 
and literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin, 
who spent much of his life examining 
the dialogical nature of language. 
Walter R. Reed weaves these trends in 
his fine and timely study of the 
Hebrew Bible and New Testament, 
Dialogues ofthe.Word. 
Approaching the Bible as a liter-
ary scholar, Reed situates himself 
between the poles of historical and 
theological readings. The historical 
approach, Reed argues, em phasizes 
the Bible's fragmentary quality, its 
"multiple sources and layers of redac-
tion" (167), or, to use Bakhtin's term, 
its centrifugal thrust. The theological 
seeks to preserve the centripetal: it 
consolidates by emphasizing the unity 
of scripture's revelation. A literary 
reading "notes the tensions between 
the assertions of discord and assertions 
of concord" (169), but seeks finally to 
locate "particular sites of coher-
ence"(l70) within the Biblical antholo-
gy. 
Why turn to Bakhtin in such 
work? Reed offers three reasons. 
Bakhtin himself analyzes and cele-
brates the struggle between unifying 
and dispersive tendencies within utter-
ance and text. Second, Bakhtin 
"acknowledg[es] different historical 
'layers' within any uttterance," and so 
is especially useful in approaching the 
process of canon formation (15). 
Third, one of the central themes of 
both the Hebrew Bible and New 
Testament is God's dialogue with His 
people, and, as a rich theorist of dia-
logue, Bakhtin offers much in the 
approach to this dialogue. 
Indeed, Bakhtin proves to be of 
valuable assistance in Reed's learned, 
detailed chapters. In one chapter, he 
employs Bakhtin 's concept of the 
chronotope to analyze the significance 
of particular contexts of time and 
place, three "paradigms of communi-
cation" in the Hebrew Bible: law, 
prophecy, and wisdom ( 47). The 
books of the law, for example, tran-
spire in the liminal space of wander-
ing, the wilderness. There, the image 
of the "house of God" is found in the 
tabernacle, its portable character 
reflecting the law's "lack of geographi-
cal fixity" (68). Later, therefore, the 
prophetic books criticize "the false 
sense of security" the people feel once 
the house of God is located in the tem-
ple. Finally, in books of wisdom such 
as Proverbs and Job, the house of God 
is "creation itself .. . a cosmic dwelling 
built by God for all his creatures" (72). 
Reed presents an extensive and 
splendid analysis of Job in a separate 
chapter and illuminates much in this 
puzzling, mysterious book. The author 
of Job questions all three of the above 
authoritative genres as law, prophecy, 
and wisdom are conflated into a "dis-
course of justice." Job's author rejects 
such discourse as it "rests on the con-
cept of a covenant or treaty with specif-
ic requirements" (128). Yahweh ' s 
voice from the whirlwind, and Job's 
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